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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN J. VANLEEUWEN, 
Claimant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
CUSTOM LANDSCAPE SERVICES, and 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
No. 940586 CA 
Priority No. 7 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is had pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1992), Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-86 
(1994), and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993). 
Statement of Issue for Review 
1. Whether Worker's Compensation coverage should be expanded 
to cover an employee driving to and from work in an employer 
provided vehicle when the employer receives no benefit from the 
travel. 
Standard of Appellate Review 
1. Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16(4) (1993) provides in parti 
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 
by any of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law; 
When a grant of discretion is not involved the court must apply a 
correction of error standard. Walls v. Industrial Comm'n., 857 
P.2d 964, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Determinative Status 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (1988) (1994 supp.) is determinative 
of this appeal. That statute reads: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury 
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment 
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, 
and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
The Petitioners in this case are seeking review of the 
Industrial Commission's Order denying review of the decision by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
Procedural History 
A formal Adjudicative Hearing was held before the Honorable 
Donald George. Judge George denied worker's compensation benefits 
to the Petitioner. Petitioner's Motion for Review was denied by 
the Industrial Commission. Petitioner is now seeking relief from 
this denial. 
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Agency Disposition of the Case 
Judge George denied the Petitioner's claim for worker's 
compensation benefits because this was not an accident arising out 
of and in the course of the Petitioner's employment. The 
Industrial Commission declined to review that decision. 
Statement of Facts 
This dispute arises out of a May 6, 1993 automobile accident 
involving the Petitioner, Steven J. Vanleeuwen. Transcipt of 
recorded proceedings at p. 9, Vanleeuwen v. Custom Landscape 
Services, (Industrial Comm'n. 1994)(n. 93-622) [hereinafter "R."]. 
At approximately 5:50 a.m., Vanleeuwen was traveling northbound on 
7th East, whereupon he was struck by another vehicle traveling 
eastound as he crossed the 39th South intersection. R. at p. 10-
11. The driver of the other vehicle was killed. R. at p. 21. 
Vanleeuwen was issued a citation for failing to stop at a red 
traffic signal. R. at p. 10. 
Custom Landscape is located at the Triad Center. R. at p. 12. 
Prior to allowing Mr. Vanleeuwen to drive the truck to and from 
work, it was parked at the Triad Center parking lot. Id. The 
Triad Center provides twenty-four hour security for its parking 
facilities. R. at p. 33. Other than an occasional transient found 
sleeping in the bed of the truck, there were no incidents of 
vandalism or other problems concerning the security of the vehicle. 
R. at p. 33. 
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At the time of the accident Custom Landscape employed 
Vanleeuwen as a "Project Supervisor". His duties involved, among 
other things, mowing lawns and removing snow. R. at pp. 10, 24. 
Vanleeuwen worked approximately 40 hours each week and was paid by 
the hour. R. at p. 30. Despite the fact that Custom Landscape 
viewed Vanleeuwen as an excellent employee, it could not afford to 
reward him. Jd. Custom Landscape then decided in lieu of an 
increase in wages, they would allow Vanleeuwen to drive the company 
truck to and from work. R. at p. 30. In this manner, Vanleeuwen 
was rewarded for his service by being able to save wear and tear on 
his own car and was guaranteed transportation to and from work. R. 
at p. 30-31. Though Vanleeuwen was allowed to charge fuel to a 
company credit card, he was never paid for the time he spent 
traveling to and from work, and he did not pick up other employees. 
All vehicle maintenance was performed at the employer's premises. 
R. at pp. 23, 32. 
All of Custom's employees, including Vanleeuwen, were required 
to gather at the employers premises at a specified time each 
morning. R. at pp. 22-23. At that time a trailer containing 
necessary equipment was hooked to the truck and driven to the 
different job sites. R. at p. 24. At the end of the work day the 
trailer would be returned to the Triad Center, id. Custom had no 
control over the route Vanleeuwen traveled to or from work. R. at 
p. 31. In fact, the only instruction Vanleeuwen had was that the 
vehicle was not for personal use. R. at p. 16 and p. 31. Even 
this instruction provided limited control as Vanleeuwen testified 
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that he would stop for dinner on his way home. R , at p. 15. while 
Vanleeuwen was on call during the winter months to perform snow 
removal duties he w.is not on call when this accident occurred in 
May, R. at p. 24. 
Summary of Argument 
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act provides coverage to 
employees injured in accidents arising out of and in the course of 
employment. In determinirig whether an accident arises out of and 
in the course of employment Utah courts look to the \ Jtdlitf if the 
circumstances. Using what is commonly known as the "coming and 
going" rule, courts have traditionally defined travel to or from 
work as being outside the course and scope of employment. 
Occasionally fact situations arise where an injury is 
considered to arise out of and in the course of employment despite 
the fact that the employee is traveling to or from work. The 
Petitioner asserts that two such situations are analogous to the 
present case. First;, Petitioner asserts that, where an employer 
furnishes transportation to the employee for the benefit u: the 
employer coverage has been granted. In the present case this is 
not true because the employer has retained no control and received 
no benefit. Second, Petitioner argues that, if an employee is 
injured while being transported in an employer's conveyance 
coverage has been qt anted. In the present case Vanleeuwen was not 
being picked up and transported to work, as a result mor^ war: IM 
control and no employer's conveyance. 
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This accident occurred while the employee was en route to 
work. The sole benefit received by Custom was Vanleeuwen's arrival 
at work, this has long been held insufficient to escape the "coming 
and going" rule. Because Custom Landscape received no benefit from 
and had no control over Vanleeuwen's use of the truck, the Court of 
Appeals should uphold the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
and deny worker's compensation benefits. 
Argument 
I. Petitioner Has Failed to Marshall the Evidence 
This appeal presents a mixed question of law and fact. When 
reviewing an agency's application of a statutory term, absent a 
grant of discretion a "correction of error" standard applies. 
Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. . 857 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). When challenging findings of fact the court of appeals has 
written: 
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the clients 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty . . ., 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings that 
appellant resists." Once appellants have established 
every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they 
then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and 
show why those pillars fail to support the trial court's 
findings. They must show that the trial court's findings 
are "so lacking in support as to be vagainst the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them vclearly 
erroneous.'" 
Onieda/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1051, 
1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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Respondents contend that Vanleeuwen has failed to discharge 
his marshalling duty. Petitioner is directly contending tlle ALJ's 
factual determination that the employer did not benefit from 
Vanleeuwen's use of the truck and did not have control over the 
vehicle at the time of the accident. Order of Administrative Law 
Judge, Vanleeuwen v. Custom Landscape Services, (Industrial Comm'n. 
1994)(n. 93-622)[hereinafter Order]. However, Petitioner has 
failed to set forth all of the evidence demonstrating that a 
benefit was received and that Custom had no control. No mention is 
made of the fact that vandalism had not been a problem, that other 
employees were not picked up en route to the office, that 
Vanle* v* paxu iox nio travel time, and that he would 
occasionally stop for personal errands un I lie way I >me R. at pp. 
15, 23, 33. 
Rather thai i marshall the evidence, the Petitioner is now 
attempting to re-try the case. Vanleeuwen, "has merely presented 
carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support 
of its position. selective citation to the record does not 
begin to marshall the evidence . . . ." Id. at 1053 The 
Petitioner "must demonstrate to the appellate courts first how the 
trial court found the facts from the evidence and second why such 
findings contradict the weight of the ev idence." Id. As a result 
Respondent has been required perform this work at "considerable 
time and expense." Id. at 1053-54. As a result the court should 
accept all findings of fact by the trial court lis true. Id. at 
1053. 
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II. The Injury Did Not Arise Out Of and in the Course Of 
Employment 
Utah Worker's Compensation Act provides coverage to employees 
injured in accidents arising out of and in the course of their 
employment. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994). Whether an injury 
arises out of and in the course of employment depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. Utah State Tax Comm'n. v. 
Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). The 
reasoning behind the facts and circumstances test is sound. The 
employment relationship has a variety of forms and the worker's 
compensation system needs to be able to adapt to those forms. 
In defining accidents arising out of and in the course of 
employment, courts have traditionally denied compensation for 
injuries which occur during the time traveling to or from work. 
See, Arthur Larsen, Workmen's Compensation, S 15.00 (1995) and 
cases cited therein. This rule, commonly referred to as the 
"coming and going" rule has been adopted in Utah. Utah State Tax 
Comm/n, 685 P.2d at 1053. While the "coming and going" rule is 
often referred to as an exception to coverage, strictly speaking it 
is not. Worker's Compensation coverage extends only to accidents 
arising out of and in the course of employment. Time spent 
traveling to and from work, absent special circumstances, does not 
arise out of and in the course of employment. This court has 
previously recognized this position because the employer has no 
control over the employee when he is coming to work and receives no 
real benefit. See, Cross v. Industrial Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) . 
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Petitioner confuses the "coming and going" rule by declaring 
it to be a two-prong test. See Petitioner's Brief at 9. (citing 
HiQQins v. Industrial Comm'n., 700 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1985), and 
Cross v. Industrial Comm'n. , 82 4 p. 2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)). Petitioner contends that in order to be within the "coming 
and going" rule one must be traveling to or coming from their place 
of employment and driving their own vehicle. See Petitioner's 
Brief at 9. This is simply an incorrect statement of the law. 
Petitioner attempts to arg ue that Utah State Tax Commission 
either failed to apply the appropriate test or Hiqqins modified the 
rule in order to narrow its application. The case law does not 
support such an argument. Petitioner makes much of the fact that 
Hiqqins was decided subsequent to Utah State Tax Comm'n. However# 
in a case decided after Hiqqins, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated 
the general rule as set; forth in Utah State Tax Comm'n, "An 
employee is not in the course of his employment while traveling to 
and from work." Cherne Construction v. Posso, 735 P.2d 384 (Utah 
1987) (citations omitted). 
Therefore, either the courts are flip flopping on the rule or 
it has never changed, closer reading of the Hiqqins case 
demonstrates that the court has never changed its position. In 
Hiqqins. the employee injured his shoulder while at work. Hiqqins, 
700 P. 2d at 705. The employee died later that evening after he 
drove his car off the road,, I d at 7 0 5-0 6. Higgins ' dependents 
filed a claim asserting that the shoulder injury was the ause of 
his leaving the road and ensuing death, they also argued that the 
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decedent's travel to and from work was included in the course of 
his employment because of the positional risk doctrine. Id. at 
706-707. Benefits were denied. .Id. at 706. In discussing the 
second issue the court stated that, "as a general rule, an employee 
is not deemed to be within the course of his employment for 
workman's compensation purposes when he furnishes his own 
transportation and is injured while going to or coming from his 
place of employment." Id. at 707 (citations omitted). 
In making this statement the court in Hicrains was not further 
limiting the "coming and going" rule, it was merely looking at the 
facts and circumstances of the case. Higgins was driving his own 
car and he was traveling home, his death was not covered. 
Furthermore, if Petitioners limited reading of the rule were 
correct, anytime an employee carpooled to work in a car belonging 
to someone else he would be covered under the worker's compensation 
laws. Cases have consistently held this to be false. See Torres 
v. Industrial Comm'n. . 670 P.2d 423 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
Therefore, Higgins is not dispositive of this issue. With the 
definition of the "coming and going" rule now established, 
Respondents turn to a discussion of its specific application in 
this case. 
The "coming and going" rule is premised upon the idea "that it 
is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct 
of its employees over which it has no control and from which it 
derives no benefit." Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 
P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). According to Whitehead the major focus 
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in applying the general rule should be on the benefit received and 
the control retained by the employer. Id. 
Respondent s concede, however, that under certain circumstances 
employers have still been held liable for injuries even though they 
occurred while traveling to or from work. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 
685 P.2a 1053. These circumstances include: 
where transportation was furnished by the employer to the 
benefit of the employer; where the employer requires the 
employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the 
business; where the employee is injured while upon a 
"special errand" or "special mission" for the employer; 
where ingress and egress to the place of employment are 
inherently dangerous; and where the employee combines 
pleasure and business on a trip, and the business part 
predominated. 
Id. (citations omitted)(emphasi s added). The facts and 
circumstances of this case do not warrant application of any of 
these "exceptions." 
A. Custom Landscape; received i;,«,„ benefit 
Petitioner contends that worker's compensation benefits should 
be granted simply because Vanleeuwen was driving an employer-owned 
vehicle. Thisf however, is an overly simplistic reading of the 
law. In addition to allowing Vanleeuwen to use the vehicle, Custom 
Landscape must receive some benefit from that use. Kinne v. 
Industrial Comm'n., 60lJ ^J 2d 9?6 pit an 1980) • 
In Kinne, Freeport Transport leased a tractor from Charles 
Kinne. Max Wynn, who was hired by Kinne as a driver, took the 
tractor to his home during an interruption of a trip from Colorado 
to California. "When he was en route from his home to Freeport's 
place of business in Clearfield, Utah, to pick up a trailer and 
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commence the final portion of the trip, the tractor was struck by 
a train and Wynn was killed." Kinne, 609 P.2d at 927. In 
analyzing the case, the court first acknowledged the general rule 
that "[w]hether an injury arises out of or within the scope of 
employment depends on the particular circumstances of each case." 
Id. (citing Moser v. Industrial Comm'n., 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968)). 
The commission found that "Wynn's practice was to take the tractor 
to his home, where he cleaned and serviced it to keep it in proper 
running condition." Id. All of the required tools were kept at 
Wynn's home, and the maintenance work was his responsibility. Id. 
The court determined that all these facts clearly demonstrated that 
Kinne derived a substantial benefit from Wynn taking the tractor to 
his home. 
In the present case all of the repair work was done at the 
shop. R. at p. 32. In fact, the only potential benefit alluded to 
is the prevention of vandalism. However, as the record shows this 
was not a problem. When asked on direct examination "were there 
any problems with vandalism to the truck down there?" Vanleeuwen 
answered, "no." R. at p. 12. 
The benefit received by the employer must be substantial. In 
Lundberg v. Cream o' Weber1, the Utah Supreme Court discussed what 
type of benefit was required. Lundberg was employed by Cream o' 
Weber to supervise sales personnel. "A company automobile was 
available to him. But he chose the option given him by the company 
of using his own car, for which he was reimbursed at eight cents 
1
 465 P.2d 175 (Utah 1970). 
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per miles traveled in the course of his duties. But this did not 
include payment for travel to and from work." Id, at 175. An 8:00 
a.m. meeting had been scheduled with company personnel. En route 
to the meeting Lundberg was killed in a J ir accident. Id. In 
discussing the case the court wrote: 
it is fundamental that even though the employee may not 
be at a regular place of work, he must be performing a 
duty for his employer, or one which is so connected with 
his employment as to be an essential part thereof, so 
that the mandate of the statute is met that there must be 
an "accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment." 
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). The court held that; travel to work, 
even for a special meeting was not essential. Jd. Cream o' Weber 
eliminates Petitioner's argument that the journey was essential 
because It was earlier than normal. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 
15. It is also important to note that in Cream o' Weber the court 
was appiyi ng a much broader statute. The disjunctive "or" used in 
arising out of or in the course of employmei it has i J :>w been repl aced 
by the word "and." See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). 
Another case discussing the benefit required is Cross v. Board 
of Review, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App, 1992) In Cross, the 
Applicant, Joel Cross, was driving his van between Salt Lake and 
Tooele. The* van exploded and Cross was severely injured. Id. at 
1203. The facts showed that "Cross drove iron, h I s home in Tooele 
to his foreman's home in Salt Lake City. He left his van there and 
traveled to l lit- Coalville worksite in another vehicle. Later that 
day, when work had ceased, Cross returned to Salt Lake CI ty, where 
he picked up his van and proceeded toward his home in Tooele." Id. 
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At the time of the explosion Cross was carrying batteries that had 
been used on a previous job for this employer. Id. The batteries 
did not cause the explosion. Id. Cross asserted, that at the time 
of the explosion he was in the course of his employment. Id. 
Cross cited several cases in which travel was to remote job sites. 
These cases, including Loffland Bros, which is cited by Petitioner, 
were distinguished as " xoil drilling cases.'" Id. at 1204. The 
Cross court wrote: 
The courts ruled in those cases that transportation for 
crew members to drilling sites was an integral and 
necessary part of employment in the oil drilling industry 
and, therefore, the commute and resulting disability were 
within the course of employee's employment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The jobsite in the instant case was not remote. In fact there 
are no facts to indicate that getting Vanleeuwen to the jobsite was 
any more integral and necessary than any other employee. Mere 
arrival at work is not enough of a benefit to bring the employee 
into the course of employment. Cross. 824 P.2d at 1205; See also 
Benson. 870 P.2d at 629. 
The reason mere arrival at work is not enough of a benefit is 
explained in Santa Rosa Junior College v. W.C.A.B., 708 P.2d 673 
(Cal. 1985). The court wrote: 
Of course we recognize that in the broadest sense an 
injury occurring on the way to one's place of employment 
is an injury "growing out of an incident to employment," 
since "a necessary part of the employment is that the 
employee shall go to and return from his place of labor." 
However, the right to an award is founded not "upon the 
fact that the injury grows out of an is incidental to his 
employment" but, rather, "upon the fact that the service 
he is rendering at the time of the injury grows out of 
and is incidental to the employment." Therefore, we 
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reasoned, "an employee going to and from his place of 
employment is not rendering any service, and begins to 
render such service only when [arriving at the place of 
employment ]." 
Id. at 676 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). Professor 
Larson explains: "[W]hen the subject of transportation is singled 
out for special consideration it is normally because the 
transportation involves a considerable distance, and therefore 
qualifies under the rule herein suggested: that employment should 
be deemed to include travel when the travel itself is a substantial 
part of the service performed." Arthur Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Desk Edition, S 16.31, p. 4-66 (1995). 
Petitioner also argues that the employer receives the benefit 
of having the truck at work each day. This reasoning is circular, 
for if the employer had not allowed the Petitioner to use the 
vehicle, there would be no need to return it to the employer's 
premises. This situation is distinct from those where the employer 
requires the employee to bring in their private vehicle for use in 
the business. In that situation the employer does not own the 
vehicle, and the only access to it can be provided by the employee. 
In the present case no substantial benefit can be found. The 
travel was not integral or necessary. There had been no problems 
with vandalism, as the Petitioner suggests. In fact there is no 
reason to believe that the vehicle was any safer parked at the 
Petitioner's home without the round the clock security which was 
provided by the Triad Center. The Petitioner simply transported 
himself to and from work. To bring this accident under the 
Worker's Compensation Act would be an illogical extension of the 
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doctrine. There is no difference between Vanleeuwen and any other 
employee commuting to work. 
B. The Employer did not Require the Employee to 
use the Vehicle as an instrumentality of the business 
The Claimant asserts that under the rules established in 
Bailey v. Industrial Comm'n. and Moser v. Industrial Comm'n., that 
he is entitled to compensation because the vehicle is an 
instrumentality of the business. However, these cases are clearly 
distinguishable. In Bailey, the Claimant drove his station wagon 
to the service station on a daily basis. The station wagon was 
regularly used in the deceased's business. It was used for 
emergency calls and tools necessary to repair service automobiles 
or kept inside. Further, Bailey permitted customers to use the car 
while theirs were being serviced. The station wagon was carried on 
his books as a business asset and oil and gas was charged as a 
business expense. Bailey v. Utah State Industrial Comm'n., 398 
P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1965). The Bailey court relied on an Iowa case 
styled Davis v. Blorenson, 293 N.W. 829 (Iowa 1940). The Bailey 
court felt that this was a substantial service required by his 
employment. The language quoted from Davis speaks of the Claimant 
having no selection as to his mode of travel, " vhe was required 
under the terms of his contract to drive his own car from his home 
to the shop where it was available to his employer for use in the 
employer's business.'" Id. at 547 (quoting Davis). In the present 
case Vanleeuwen was not required by the terms of employment to 
drive his own car to work. Rather, he was given the option to use 
the company truck for his commute. This courtesy was merely 
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offered to the employee as a benefit in lieu of a raise in pay. 
The employee could have chosen to reject or accept this benefit and 
still maintain his position of employment. Therefore, because 
there was no requirement placed upon the employee to drive the 
vehicle, the Bailey case is inapplicable. 
The case of Moser v. Industrial Comm'n., 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 
1968), can also be distinguised. In Moser, the Claimant suffered 
burns while attempting to start his truck. Id. Moser had leased 
his truck to his employer, Commercial Carriers. Id. The truck 
company had full rights of possession, use and control over the 
vehicle. Id. One evening Moser traveled to Commercial Carrier's 
terminal and obtained his assignment for the next day. He then 
drove the truck to a lot near his home as was permitted by his 
employer. JEd. at 24. The following morning the truck would not 
start. "He phoned the Defendant's manager who told him to check 
the truck for ignition and gas to try to correct the situation; and 
that if he couldn't, help would be sent." Id. It was while 
carrying out these instructions that the Claimant spilled gasoline 
which ignited, causing the burns and subsequent disability. Id. 
The facts of that case indicate that not only did the Claimant 
drive the truck home, he engaged in repairing the truck at the 
direction of his employer. There is no question that if the 
Claimant in the instant case had been engaged in repairing the 
truck in order that it could be brought to the shop for the day's 
work, he would have been within the course of his employment. 
Further, in Moser it appears that the Claimant had picked up the 
truck in order to begin his assignment the next morning as a 
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driver. Id. Therefore, by arriving at the lot in which the truck 
was stored he had entered into the course of his employment. The 
instant case simply does not meet the standards set forth in Moser 
or Bailey. 
C. The Employer lacked Control over the 
Activities of the Claimant 
As was stated above, the Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead 
established: 
The major premise of the going-and-coming rule is 
that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an 
employer for conduct of its employees over which it has 
no control and from which it derives no benefit. 
Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not 
the general rule should apply in a given case is on the 
benefit the employer receives and his control over the 
conduct. 
Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937. Respondents have demonstrated that 
they received no benefit. Therefore, the discussion now turns to 
the issue of control. 
The facts of this case demonstrate that if Custom Landscape 
had any control, it was so insubstantial as to amount to no control 
at all. The only instruction given to Vanleeuwen was that he 
should not use the truck for personal purposes. R. at p. 32. 
Custom Landscape had no control over the route that would be taken, 
the speed at which the claimant would travel, the traffic signals 
which he would choose or not choose to obey. R. at p. 25. In 
fact, the record demonstrates that Vanleeuwen would occasionally 
stop for dinner on the way home from work. R. at p. 31. 
Petitioner cites the case of Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d 820, 
822 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), for the proposition that "it is the right 
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of control that is the critical element not the actual control 
exercised." This case is inapplicable. Mitchell was dealing with 
the question of whether an employment relationship even existed. 
Custom Landscape freely admits that Vanleeuwen was an employee at 
the time of the accident, however, we dispute whether the injuries 
occurred in an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment. Custom Landscape had the "right to control" Vanleeuwen 
while he was engaged in his employment. That right to control did 
not extend to time spent in transit to and from work. Vanleeuwen 
would stop for personal errands and he would always choose his own 
route. R. at pp. 20, 25. These are not the indicia of control 
necessary to allow coverage under the Act. 
III. The use of the Employer's Conveyance Doctrine is a 
Misapplication of the Law 
By arguing that the instant case involves the employer's 
conveyance doctrine the Petitioner is confusing two distinct areas 
of the law. According to Professor Larson, "When the journey to or 
from work is made in the employer's conveyance, the journey is in 
the course of employment, the reason being that the risks of the 
employment continue throughout the journey." Arthur Larson, 
Workman's Compensation Desk Edition § 17.00 (1995). Larson states, 
"[t]he justification for this holding is that the employer has 
himself expanded the range of the employment and the attendant 
risks." This information was dutifully set forth by the Petitioner 
in their brief. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 12-13. However, 
Petitioner neglected to advise the court of the following paragraph 
which states: 
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It is important in certain cases to observe that the 
reasons underpinning the rule on furnishing of travel 
expenses or company automobiles in the last section and 
the rule on furnishing transportation in a conveyance 
under the employer's control in this section are two 
different reasons. The reason for the rule in the 
preceding section depends upon the relative importance of 
travel as a part of the service performed; the supplying 
of cash or cars is evidence of the status of the journey 
as part of the compensated employment. The reason for 
the rule in this section depends upon the extension of 
the risks under the employer's control. 
Larson, at S 17.00 (emphasis added) See Torres, 670 P.2d at 426-27. 
An employer's conveyance involves a situation in which for example 
the employer would send a vehicle around to pick up the Claimant 
and drive him to work. In this instance, the vehicle is under the 
control of the employer and any injuries that would occur would 
result from expansion of the risk. 
In the present case the facts are not such that the employer 
picked the employee up and transported him to work, the employer 
merely allowed him the use of his vehicle. Further, as was 
explained above, Custom Landscape had no control over this journey. 
That the Petitioner is confusing the law is further demonstrated by 
his commingling of citations from Section 16 which deals with 
furnishing transportation and Section 17 which deals with the 
employer's conveyance doctrine. 
IV. Sister State Cases cited by the Petitioner are 
Distinguishable 
The first case cited by the Claimant is Hanson v. Estate of 
Harvey, 806 P.2d 450 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990). In Hanson, Gerald 
Hanson and Robert Layman were employed by Don Harvey Roofing 
Company. Id. at 450. At the time of the accident they were 
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traveling in one of Don Harvey's trucks driven by a co-employee, 
James Harvey. Layman and Hanson applied for and received worker's 
compensation benefits in Washington. In Idaho they sought recovery 
for damages in Tort, arguing the contrary position taken in 
Washington. Jd. at 451. The court stated the general rule along 
with the exception for accidents incurred while "going and 
returning in some transportation facility furnished by the employer 
. . . . " Id. at 451-52. 
This is a case squarely within the employer conveyance 
doctrine. Hanson and Layman were not provided with a company car, 
they were picked up by a fellow employee in a company truck and 
driven to the job site. The employer retained control over the 
conveyance. Furthermore, the court was likely influenced by the 
fact that they had previously received worker's compensation from 
benefits in Washington and then tried to deny their status as 
employees in Idaho. As has been demonstrated, the present 
situation did not involve an employer's conveyance, rather it 
involved a company car which was given to the employee to travel to 
and from work, no control was retained by Custom Landscape. 
Hanson, therefore, is inapplicable to the present situation. 
The next case cited by Claimants is Loffland Bros, v. Baca, 
651 P.2d 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). In Loffland Bros, the Claimant 
was injured in a one car accident while riding in a vehicle driven 
by a fellow driller. In deciding the case the Court of Appeals 
looked at the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 432. Factors 
considered in arriving at their decision were: the considerable 
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distance of driving from the office in Colorado to the drilling rig 
in Vernal, Utah; the benefit to the employer of having a full crew 
on hand; and the fact that the driller was paid to collect the crew 
and bring them to the drill site. This again is a classic 
employer's conveyance situation. Loffland Bros, had complete 
control over the driver who was paid to go and pick up workers and 
bring them to the work site. Further, the considerable distance 
traveled made driving a substantial part of the employment. These 
are facts not present in the instant case. 
The Claimants also cite Maryland Casualty Co. v. Messina, 874 
P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1994), for the proposition that the Colorado 
Supreme Court has synthesized the decisions in Loffland Bros, and 
Varsity Contractors Home Ins. Co. v. Bacca, 709 P.2d 55 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1985). However, because the facts in Loffland Bros, are 
inapplicable and the fact that Petitioner's travel was no more 
requested than any other employee's, Maryland Casualty is 
inapplicable. 
The Petitioner continues to rely heavily on Colorado cases 
such as Benson v. Colorado Comprehensive Ins. Authority 2 and 
Monolith Portland Cement v. Burrack 3 In Benson the Claimant was 
a nurse injured in an automobile accident while traveling between 
job assignments for her employer. Benson, 870 P.2d at 627. The 
court reasoned: 
2
 870 P.2d 624 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). 
3
 772 P.2d 688 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). 
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Generally injuries sustained while traveling to and 
from work are not considered to have occurred within the 
scope of employment. However, an exception applies when 
the employee's travel is at the express or implied 
request of the employer or when the travel confers a 
benefit on the employer beyond the sole fact of the 
employee's arrival at work. 
Here, Plaintiff was traveling between job 
assignments for her employer, and because of the nature 
of her employment, this travel conferred a benefit on 
Alpha and Omega beyond the mere fact of her arrival at 
work. 
Id. at 627 (citations omitted). 
Once again, the present case is distinguishable. Had the 
Petitioner been traveling from one mowing job to another, clearly 
the accident would have been one arising out of and in the course 
of employment. However, Petitioner was merely commuting to work in 
the morning, his situation was no different than any other 
employee. He was not conferring "a benefit on [the employer] 
beyond the mere fact of [his] arrival at work." Id. 
Monolith, at first glance, appears somewhat analogous to the 
present situation. However, a closer look uncovers significant 
differences. Ronald Burrack died in an automobile accident in 
Colorado while driving to work in Wyoming. Monolith had provided 
Burrack with a company car. Burrack was allowed to use the car for 
both personal and business purposes. Monolith, 772 P.2d at 689. 
Monolith paid for insurance and for fuel. Id. On the morning of 
the accident Burrack suffered a heart attack and lost control of 
his vehicle. The court held that, "ordinarily, an employee injured 
while traveling to or from work is not entitled to compensation." 
Id. (citations omitted). The court then stated, "when the 
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employer agrees to provide the worker with means of transportation 
or to pay the employee's cost of commuting, the scope of employment 
inferentially includes the employee's transportation." Id. 
(citations omitted) . If this was all the court had stated this 
case may have been persuasive, however, the court went on to list 
several other factors in their decision. The court found that, 
"Burrack's home, and indeed even the vehicle, had become part of 
his work place." Id. at 690. Evidence was admitted showing that 
Burrack had dictating equipment in the car and often dictated 
company business during his commute. Id. In fact, the dictating 
machine was on at the time of the accident. Jd. In the present 
case the Claimant was involved in no work activities while 
traveling to and from work. The record shows that he often filled 
out time cards when he arrived at home, but this was his choice. 
The cards could have been filled out at the office before the trip 
home at night. Merely choosing to perform work at home does not 
bring the worker under the act. Therefore, Monolith is completely 
distinguishable. 
The final Colorado case cited by the Claimant is Industrial 
Comm'n. v. Lavach.4 In Lavach the company had explicitly 
contracted with Lavach to provide a company truck and Lavach often 
performed deliveries on his route home as a benefit to the company. 
Id. at 363-361. Vanleeuwen did not regularly run errands for 
Custom Landscape on his route to and from work. The record shows 
that he was on call during the winter, but such was not the case in 
4
 439 P.2d 359 (Colo. 1968). 
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May when this accident occurred. R. at pp. 24-25. Vanleeuwen's 
only purpose in driving that morning was his arrival at work. 
The Petitioner next discusses the case of Maryland Casualty 
Co. v. Lorkovic, 641 A.2d 924 (Md. Ct. App. 1994). The Maryland 
Casualty case is again factually distinct from the present case. 
Lorkovic was injured in a one car accident while driving home from 
the Baltimore-Washington International Airport. Id. at 927. 
Maryland Casualty regularly reimbursed Lorkovic for business 
travel. This included reimbursement for mileage between his home 
and the airport. id. at 935. The court felt that this was 
important in light of the fact Maryland Casualty did not pay 
Lorkovic for normal travel between his home and the office. Again, 
Vanleeuwen was not on any business trip, rather he was commuting 
between his home and oficce. 
The final case cited by the Petitioner is Jose Andrade 
Painting v. Jaimes, 428 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). The 
Petitioner properly stated the rule, but his application is 
somewhat suspect. The Georgia Court of Appeals wrote: 
It is well settled that xa workman injured going to 
or [coming] from the place of work is not "in the course 
of his employment." There is an exception however, as 
well established as the rule itself. The exception, 
which is supported by overwhelming authority, is this: 
When a workman is so injured while being transported in 
a vehicle furnished by his employer as an incident of the 
employment, he is within "the course of employment," as 
contemplated by the act. In other words when the vehicle 
is supplied by the employer for the mutual benefit of 
himself and the work and to facilitate the progress of 
the work the employment begins when the workman enters 
the vehicle and ends when he leaves it on the termination 
of his labor. . . .'" 
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Id. at 641-642 (citations omitted)(underline added). The rule 
states that not only must the vehicle be furnished by the employer, 
but it must also be furnished for the mutual benefit of the 
employer and the employee. If the Georgia rule is applied to the 
present case, Petitioner loses. As has been demonstrated several 
times, no benefit has been received by Custom Landscape. There 
were no problems with vandalism and mere arrival at work is not 
enough. Further, to argue that the benefit is the arrival of the 
truck at work is circular. 
While all of these cases are inapplicable to the present case, 
there is another reason to disregard them. Utah has a well 
developed worker's compensation system and the courts have clearly 
set forth the standard to be met when dealing with these issues. 
To the extent that these cases are inconsistent with utah law they 
should be disregarded. If the court desires to look to other 
jurisdictions, two cases are more clearly on point than any cited 
by the Petitioner. 
The New Mexico case of Rinehart v. Mosman-Gladden, Inc., 423 
P.2d 991 (N.M. 1967) is amazingly similar to the case at hand. In 
Rinehart, the Claimant was employed as a gardener by Mosman-Gladden 
for approximately seven years. Xd. at 991. A few months after 
beginning his employment with Mosman-Gladden, a vehicle was 
provided to Rinehart for his use at work and in going to and from 
work. Id. The vehicle was provided in lieu of a pay raise. JEd. 
In March of 1965 while traveling home in the vehicle the Claimant 
was injured in a collision. Id. The Claimant argued that because 
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"he was en route home in transportation furnished by his employer 
pursuant to contract between them, he was, therefore, in the course 
of his employment at the time and entitled to receive workman's 
compensation." Id. The courts stated the general coming-and-going 
rule and then discussed its exceptions. Ld. at 992. The court, 
citing Professor Larson, stated: 
The basic principle or premise underlying the 
"exceptions" to the going-and-coming rule and the clue to 
their proper limits is found in the principle that the 
injury is compensable only when the journey is an 
inherent part of the service for which the employee is 
compensated or where the travel itself is a substantial 
part of the service performed. 
Id. The court relied heavily on the following facts: 
His duties in behalf of the employer had terminated 
for the day. He was not being compensated for the time 
spent en route between the place of work and his home. 
The accident did not occur on the employer's premises, 
nor did Plaintiff's duties require his presence at the 
place where the accident occurred. The risk which caused 
the accident was one common to the traveling public and 
was not created by his employment. 
Id. The court also felt that it was important that the Claimant 
was not being required to transport himself or his crew an unusual 
distance; he was not performing any duties which would make the 
travel an inherent part of his employment; and the vehicle was not 
under the control of his employer. Ld. For these reasons the 
court denied compensation. The Rinehart case, more than any other, 
is analogous to the situation at hand. 
Another helpful case is Funk v. A. F. Scheppmann & Son Const. 
Co., 199 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1972). In Funk, the Claimant resided in 
Worthington, Minnesota. Scheppmann, his employer, was also 
headquartered in Minnesota. The Claimant was employed as a field 
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supervisor on Scheppmann construction projects in Iowa. The 
Claimant was furnished with a company pickup truck, together with 
expenses for its operation. The Claimant was permitted to use the 
truck in going to and from his home on evenings and on weekends. 
The decedent was killed in an automobile accident while traveling 
to his home in Minnesota. Id. at 792. A statutory provision 
stated: 
Where the employer regularly furnished 
transportation to his employees to and from the place of 
employment such employees are subject to this chapter 
while being so transported . . . 
Id. (citing Minn. Stat. S 176.011 (16)). 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that this provision was 
inapplicable to "an employee who, although using his employer's 
motor vehicle with the employer's permission, is traveling to or 
from his home for his own personal convenience and not in the 
performance of services for his employer." Id. 
One interesting note from both Funk and Jose Andrade is the 
use of the language "while being transported." A plain reading of 
this language can only lead to the conclusion that the employer 
must be doing the transporting. In other words the employer must 
retain control over the travel. As has been demonstrated in the 
instant case no control was retained. 
In the present case, the Claimant was using the vehicle solely 
for his personal convenience in traveling to and from work. The 
sole benefit conferred upon the employer was Claimant's arrival at 
work, which has already been held as insufficient to being an 
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employee under the statute. Cross, 824 P.2d at 1205; see also 
Benson, 870 P.2d at 627. 
V. Failure to Obey Traffic Signal only goes to Issue of 
Control 
Claimant makes an argument that the failure to obey a traffic 
signal does not remove the Claimant from the course of employment. 
Respondents are well aware that the fault is not an issue under the 
Worker's Compensation Act. No argument has been made that the 
failure to obey the traffic signal removed the Claimant from the 
course of employment. However, respondents assert that the 
Claimant's failure to obey the traffic signal is another indicator 
of the lack of control respondents had over the situation, and 
therefore, should be looked at in any examination of the totality 
of the circumstances. 
VI. Extension of Worker's Compensation Coverage would Violate 
the Purpose of this System 
Petitioner was correct in asserting that one of the purposes 
of the worker's compensation system is to provide financial 
stability to workers injured in accidents arising out of and in the 
course of their employment. However, that is not the sole purpose 
of the worker's compensation system. 
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act "is to 
provide speedy and certain compensation for workmen and 
their dependents and to avoid the delay, expense and 
uncertainty which were involved prior to the act; and the 
concomitant purpose of protecting the employer from the 
hazards of exorbitant and in some instances perhaps 
ruinous liabilities. •• 
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Lantz v. National Semiconductor, 775 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(quoting Adamson v. Oakland Construction Co., 508 P.2d 805, 
807 (Utah 1973))(emphasis added). 
There is no question that courts should take into account the 
purpose of financially stabilizing the worker. However, the court 
should also consider the purpose of not placing exorbitant and 
often ruinous liabilities on the employer. If the employee is 
deemed to be in the course of employment merely because a car is 
furnished, regardless of the fact that no control is retained and 
no benefit is received by the employer, two things will occur. 
First, workers compensation will move one step closer to forcing 
employers to become a general insurer of all its employees for any 
injuries they receive regardless of when they occur. Second, small 
businesses, such as Custom Landscape, which cannot afford to give 
higher pay will abstain from providing other "perks" in lieu of pay 
raises. This will serve only to hurt both employers and employees. 
Make no mistake, but that Petitioner is seeking a definate 
expansion to the exisitng worker's compensation system. Such an 
expansion is solely the province of the legislature, and should 
accordingly be left to that branch of the government. The Utah 
worker's compensation Act is not a body of law that has grown stale 
over time and therefore requires judicial repair, rather it is a 
vibrant area of the law constantly under the scrutiny of the 
legislature. In fact rather than expand coverage, the legislature 
has removed the disjunctive "or" and created a more narrow coverage 
that reads "arising out of and in the course of employment." 
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Conclusion 
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act provides coverage to 
employees for injuries suffered in the course of their employment. 
This coverage, however, does not extend to injuries which occur 
traveling to and from work. The facts in this case demonstrate 
that Vanleeuwen received a substantial benefit from driving 
Custom's truck to and from work. The facts also demonstrate that 
Custom received no benefit. There was no vandalism, the benefit of 
having the truck there is circular, and the benefit of having 
Vanleeuwen arrive at work is simply not enough. Furthermore, 
Custom Landscape had no control over the Claimant's travels to and 
from work. Finally, any further extensions to the coverage 
provided by the Worker's Compensation Act would impose onerous 
liabilities on the employers of this state and could have 
potentially devastating effect. The employers of this State are 
not, nor should they be the general insurers of the health of their 
employees. 
The Worker's Compensation Act was established by the 
legislature to cover injuries from accidents arising out of and in 
the course of employment. Mr. Vanleeuwen's injuries do not meet 
this test. For these reasons the decision of both the ALJ and the 
Industrial Commission should be upheld and benefits should be 
denied. 
31 
Dated this * ' day of fM^i^, 1995. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Custom Landscape 
Services and CNA Insurance 
Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ?1 day of J^^< 
1994, a true and correct copy of A Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Allen Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
P. 0. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Brad C. Smith 
David S. Kunz 
Attorneys for Claimant 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
H:\WP\TNH\VANLEEUW 
32 
